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Galactic Stupidity and the Business Judgment Rule
David Rosenberg*
The only real difference I detect in various formulations of the [business 
judgment] rule involves the question whether if good faith and due care are 
established, there nevertheless remains room for a judicial judgment concerning 
the wisdom of the decision.1
I. Introduction
It is a truth almost universally acknowledged that American courts will not review 
the substance of the business decisions of corporate directors except under extraordinary 
circumstances.  Embodied in the much-debated “business judgment rule,”2 the deference 
displayed towards the decisions of corporate directors arises not from a belief that 
directors are always right, or even always honorable, but from a belief that “investors’ 
wealth would be lower if managers’ decisions were routinely subjected to strict judicial 
*
 Associate Professor, Department of Law, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City University of 
New York.    The author is particularly indebted to the weblogs (usually called “blogs,” sometimes, 
“blawgs”) of Professor D. Gordon Smith (www.theconglomerate.org – Smith now shares his blog with 
others, but his comments on the business judgment rule discussed here was made when he was blogging 
alone at www.venturpreneur.com) and Professor Stephen Bainbridge (www.professorbainbridge.com).  
Their lively, but always scholarly, exchange on the issue of good faith gave rise to many of the ideas in this 
article.  These and other blogs by legal scholars are among the best examples of innovative uses of the 
internet in what appears to be the dawning of a new era in legal “publishing.”  The importance (and 
credibility) of law blogs was confirmed when the Supreme Court of the United States cited its first blog in 
January, 2005. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 775 n.4 (2005). This article will make citations 
to law blogs as with any other legal source.  The reader will be left to his own devices to determine the 
value as authority of such sources.  Thanks are due to Barry Adler for first suggesting the term “galactic 
stupidity” to me and to Baruch College for the financial support it provided during the writing of this 
article.
1
 In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 1989 WL 7036 at *13 n. 13 (Del. Ch.) (italics added). 
2
 Indeed the very term “business judgment rule” has come under criticism.  One commentator, for example, 
insists that it is not a “rule,” but a “standard” with no “bright-line” separating acceptable from prohibited 
conduct.  Stephen M. Bainbridge, “The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,” 57 Vand L. Rev. 
83, 128 (2004).
2review.”3  Corporate directors take the kind of risks that investors want them to take 
because the directors know that, whatever the outcome, stockholders will not have any 
legal recourse for losses arising from those actions unless the decisionmakers violated a 
duty such as loyalty or good faith.  The belief in this general principle of the business 
judgment rule is so widespread that, despite the recent scandals and negative publicity 
surrounding the conduct of corporate directors, few participants in the debate are calling 
for significant changes to the rule’s deference to actions taken by corporate 
decisionmakers. 
There is plainly broad agreement that shareholders make more money when 
directors know that they can make decisions – especially risky decisions – without the 
fear that they4 or the company will be the subject of successful legal actions should those 
decisions not ultimately benefit the company or the shareholders themselves. This does 
not mean that the legislative, judicial, legal, financial, academic and investor 
communities do not view with disdain directors who make bad decisions, foolish 
decisions or excessively risky decisions.  It simply means that these communities do not 
wish to impose legal liability on directors or the corporations they oversee for the 
3
 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 93 (1991).  See 
also, In Re Caremark Intern. Inc. Deriv. Lit., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“To employ a different 
rule – one that permitted an ‘objective’ evaluation of the decision – would expose directors to substantive 
second guessing by ill-equipped judges or juries, which would, in the long-run be injurious to investor 
interests.”), E. Norman Veasey and Christine T. Di Guglielmo, “What Happened in Delaware Corporate 
Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments,” 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1399, 1413 (2005) (Retired Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court and co-author note that “Good 
governance practices permit the time-honored business judgment rule regime to operate with integrity by 
checking self-interest and sloth while permitting valuable and prudent risk taking.”).  
4
 This article does not focus on the issue of the personal liability of corporate directors, but rather on the 
ability of shareholders to bring any kind of successful legal action (for example, an injunction) against them 
or against the company itself for decisions made by the directors on the company’s behalf.  While section 
102(b)(7) of Delaware’s corporate code permits exculpation of directors for certain breaches of fiduciary 
duty, that is a separate issue from the question of the breadth of the business judgment rule’s protection.  
For a recent discussion of the exculpation issue, see David Rosenberg, “Making Sense of Good Faith in 
Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law,” 29 Del. J. Corp. Law 491 (2004).
3negative consequences of such decisions.5  A board of directors that pig-headedly leads a 
corporation in the wrong direction is worthy of our contempt and deserves to be voted out 
or abandoned by investors.  But our corporate law does not allow the aggrieved to seek 
legal action against a corporation just because its directors made a bad decision.  As such, 
the business judgment rule does not seem to have a moral or ethical dimension.  Rather, it 
is one our most utilitarian rules.  Wealth is maximized when corporations are run by 
directors who know that their decisions will be reviewed by investors, by analysts, by 
stockholders and by business partners – but not by the courts. 6
From a practical point of view, the business judgment rule is “simply a policy of 
judicial non-review.”7  It is -- except when it allows review.  The problem is, as a noted 
5
 Of course, the marketplace provides effective extra-legal remedies and incentives that work to promote 
good conduct by directors.  See, Edward B. Rock and Michael L. Wachter, “Islands of Conscious Power: 
Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation,” 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1619, 1672.   
6 In the recent decision in the much-litigated case involving Disney’s hiring and firing of Michael Ovitz, 
Chancellor Chandler began with an almost-sentimental affirmation of the importance of allowing directors 
discretion to create wealth through their own decision-making:
The redress for failures that arise from faithful management must come from the markets, through 
the action of shareholders and the free flow of capital, and not from this Court. Should the Court 
apportion liability based on the ultimate outcome of decisions taken in good faith by faithful 
directors or officers, those decision-makers would necessarily take decisions that minimize risk, 
not maximize value.  The entire advantage of the risk-taking, innovative, wealth-creating engine 
that is the Delaware corporation would cease to exist, with disastrous results for shareholders and 
society alike. 
In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 2005 WL 1875804 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005) ( “Disney IV”).  In 
the most recent decision, the Delaware Court of Chancery appeared to adopt a shorthand system for 
referring to the many decisions in the dispute.  This article will follow the Court’s lead. The Delaware 
Supreme Court heard oral argument in an appeal of the case on January 26, 2006.  The reader will notice 
the conspicuous absence of Disney III (In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 2004 WL 2050138 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 10 2004) from this discussion.  That ruling is not relevant here because it largely concerned 
the issue of whether or not Michael Ovitz owed a fiduciary duty to Disney at the time he was negotiating 
his employment package.  It did not focus on whether the decisions of the various directors should receive 
the protection of the business judgment rule for their decision to approve Ovitz’s compensation package.
7
 Lyman Johnson, “The Modest Business Judgment Rule,” 55 Bus. Law. 625, 631 (2000).  A more purist 
view of the business judgment rule is exemplified by the work of Stephen Bainbridge whose conception of 
the corporation requires an almost-reflexive refusal by courts to review director decision-making.  See, 
Bainbridge “Abstention Doctrine,” supra, note__.  Bainbridge argues that, whatever the standard is that 
allows review, courts should approach allegations of director misconduct with the presumption that they 
will abstain from reviewing the directors’ actions.   Such an approach, he says, makes review “the 
exception rather than the rule.” Id. at 128.  This article attempts to determine when Delaware courts will 
make that exception.
4scholar has put it, to identify the circumstances in which review is necessary.8    While 
many academics and judges repeatedly assert that the business judgment rule does not 
allow for review of the substance of director decision-making, Delaware courts 
nonetheless display an apparent willingness to do just that when the directors’ actions 
approach the borderline of good faith.9 Indeed, in cases in which the plaintiffs allege bad 
faith but the facts do not present evidence of disloyalty or knowing breach of a duty, 
courts must review the substance of the directors’ decision in order to determine whether 
or not the directors have complied with the all of their fiduciary obligations.
Although few courts or commentators are willing to use the term, substantive due 
care analysis is in fact alive in Delaware fiduciary law, and has been for at least two 
decades. Whether they call it irrationality, inexplicable behavior, egregious 
decisionmaking, gross abuse of discretion, inadequacy, action that is beyond the realm of 
human comprehension, sustained inattention, disloyalty or bad faith, judges and 
commentators from all sides of the debate must recognize that sometimes courts cannot 
avoid reviewing the substantive merits of directors actions.  Culminating in the recent 
decision in the Disney litigation, Delaware courts express an unwillingness to engage in 
substantive review, do it anyway, but almost inevitably find in favor of the defendants. 
8
 Bainbridge, “Abstention Doctrine,” supra note__at 127.
9
 This article focuses exclusively on Delaware law because it is considered the default source for American 
corporate law and because the debate over substantive due care has begun to play out in its courts.  While 
not the subject of this article, a comparison of Delaware’s approach to that of other states is a subject ripe 
for research.
5II. Is Substantive Due Care “Foreign” to the Business Judgment Rule?
Courts have a relatively easy time reviewing allegations of disloyalty or self-
dealing by corporate directors.  Virtually every formulation of the business judgment rule 
precludes protection of directors who do not act in the best interests of the company but 
rather for their own benefit.10  Rebutting the presumption of director loyalty is a fairly 
straightforward matter for the plaintiff.  He must simply show that the director herself 
benefited from the decision, and that the decision was not fair.  The rule therefore allows 
aggrieved shareholders to recover when a director made a decision that was tainted by 
self-interest and that was not a good deal for the company.  To allow a court to review a 
disloyal decision and even to impose liability on a company for a disloyal and unfair 
decision does not threaten the freedom of directors to act with discretion because in such 
a situation one might say that the director did not exercise discretion at all.  Rather, the 
director acted in direct contradiction to her obligation to make decisions on behalf of the 
well-being of the corporation and its shareholders rather than herself.
The appropriateness of judicial review becomes trickier, however, when the 
plaintiff alleges not that the director breached his duty of loyalty, but rather that the 
director breached some other duty (we will attempt to define it) that did not apparently 
involve self-interest.  A director breaches no duty simply because he makes a decision 
that does not turn out to benefit the corporation even if it was obvious to most observers 
at the time that it was a bad decision.  It is well-settled that the business judgment rule 
10
 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).  This justifiably much-maligned decision also held 
that courts will presume that directors acted “on an informed basis” and in “good faith.”  Id.  What these 
terms mean is plainly open to question.  Its holding regarding loyalty, however, is less controversial.
6will not allow review of director decisions that, in retrospect are “pretty dumb,”11
“substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through ‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or 
‘irrational.’”12  Delaware courts will not, as Chancellor Chandler recently wrote, “hold 
fiduciaries liable for a failure to comply with the aspirational ideal of best practices.”13
Put another way, Delaware courts will not review the substantive wisdom of decisions 
made by corporate directors; put another way, courts will not engage in substantive due 
care analysis.
Although the phrase “substantive due care” had been used in various jurisdictions 
over the years, it became code for that-which-is-not-reviewable in the wake of the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Brehm v. Eisner14 in 2000, the first pivotal 
decision in the Disney litigation.  In that decision, the court reviewed a lower court ruling 
dismissing a shareholder derivative suit against the Walt Disney Company for approving 
an extremely generous employment contract for executive Michael Ovitz.  The deal 
allowed Ovitz to leave the company fourteen months after his hire with a severance 
package worth $140 million.15
That shareholders of Disney wanted a court to review the directors’ conduct in 
approving such a payout is not surprising.  Nor is it surprising that the Delaware Supreme 
Court failed to embrace that prospect with much enthusiasm.16  The court took particular 
pains to address the plaintiffs’ allegation that the directors failed to exercise “substantive 
11
 Rock and Wachter, supra note__ at 1672.
12
 In Re Caremark Intern. Inc. Deriv. Lit., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
13
 Disney IV, at 1.
14
 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (“Brehm”).  
15 Id.
16 Id., at 266 (noting that it runs “counter to the foundation of our jurisprudence” for courts to “become 
super-directors, measuring matters of degree in business decision-making”).
7due care.”  In a now much-quoted passage17, the court attempted to dispose of the idea of 
substantive due care review in Delaware law: 
As for the plaintiff’s contention that the directors failed to exercise “substantive 
due care,” we should note that such a concept is foreign to the business judgment 
rule. Courts do not measure or quantify directors’ judgments.  We do not even 
decide if they are reasonable in this context.  Due care in the decision-making 
context is process due care only.  Irrationality is the outer limit of the business 
judgment rule.  Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or 
it may tend to show that the decision is not made in good faith, which is a key 
ingredient of the business judgment rule.18
Nonetheless, the court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint so that it would 
allege more specific facts that might present doubt that the decision of the directors to 
approve Ovitz’s employment package was protected by the business judgment rule.19
The language quoted above ought to have put to rest the idea that courts might be 
willing to review director decisions based on the substantive wisdom of the decision 
itself. Indeed, the author of the opinion, former Chief Justice Veasey has taken to quoting 
its language as an unambiguous affirmation of a rule that requires little interpretation.20
Far from it.  In fact that ruling led the Court of Chancery to reassert the possibility of 
17
 A few years after the decision, one commentator said that the decision actually served as a 
“reinvigoration of substantive due care” by putting a greater emphasis on the duty of good faith which 
might ultimately lead to examination of the substance of a director’s decision. D. Gordon Smith, 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2003/11/the_fiduciary_d.html, November 26, 2003.  Smith has since 
changed his mind and more recently has described the case as “a modern version of Van Gorkom.” 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2005/01/emthe_good_fait.html. January 9, 2005.  I point out that Smith 
changed his mind not to suggest that he is fickle, but rather to illustrate the fluidity of the debate on 
substantive due care.  It perhaps also illustrates the dangers of using law blogs as legal authority since they 
are intended to, among other things, allow their authors to air ideas without committing those ideas to the 
permanence of traditional publications.
18
 Brehm  746 A.2d at 264.
19
 Brehm  746 A.2d at 266.
20 See, E. Norman Veasey, “Juxtaposing Best Practices and Delaware Corporate Jurisprudence,” 18 No. 12 
Insights 5 (2004). It is worth pointing out though, that in Brehm, he said that the business judgment rule 
had been “well formulated by Aronson…”, Brehm at 264, fn. 64, although that formulation has been almost 
universally condemned.  See, e.g. Johnson, supra, note__, at 626.
8reviewing director decisions on the substantive merits by simply calling it by another 
name.21
III. The “Reinvigoration”22 of Substantive Due Care
In 2003, the Court of Chancery finally got a chance to hear the plaintiffs’ 
amended complaint in the Disney litigation.23  In refusing to dismiss the complaint, the 
court took a hard look at the actions (and inactions) of the company’s directors when they 
approved Ovitz’s seemingly preposterous no-fault termination agreement.  More or less 
ignoring the language used by the Supreme Court in Brehm, the Court of Chancery 
focused on the state of mind of the directors, ultimately framing the issue around the 
question of good faith.24  The court said that the complaint depicted the directors’ actions
as failures going beyond mere negligence or even gross negligence because the plaintiffs 
had claimed that “the defendant directors consciously and intentionally disregarded their 
responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t care about the risks’ attitude concerning a material 
corporate decision.”25 The court placed heavy emphasis on the allegation that the 
directors knew that they were making a decision without adequate information and that 
they “simply did not care if the decisions caused the corporation and its stockholder to 
21 See D. Gordon Smith, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2003/11/the_fiduciary_d.html, November 26, 
2003.  
22
 http://www.theconglomerate.org/2003/11/the_fiduciary_d.html, November 26, 2003
23
 In Re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 825 A.2d 275 (2003).  (“Disney II”).
24
 This was not the first time the Court of Chancery boldly departed from the guidance offered by the 
state’s highest court regarding the fiduciary duties of corporate directors.  In determining the meaning of 
the term “good faith” as it appears in Section 102(b)(7), the law which allows corporations to waive the 
liability of directors for certain breaches of fiduciary duty, the Court of Chancery has criticized the 
Supreme Court’s language and formulated its own definition of that crucial term.  See Rosenberg, supra
note__.
25
 Disney II, 825 A.2d at 289.  The court said that the complaint charged the board of directors with taking 
an “ostrich-like approach regarding Ovitz’s non-fault termination.” Id. at 288.  It’s a nice metaphor 
(presumably alluding to the popular belief that an ostrich sticks its head in the sand when it encounters 
trouble) because it plainly indicates that the board did not merely fail to consider what it might have seen, 
but rather it deliberately failed to see.
9suffer injury or loss.”26  If such allegations are true, the court said, defendants might have 
breached their obligation “to act honestly and in good faith in the corporation’s best 
interests” and their conduct therefore could well have fallen outside the protection of the 
business judgment rule.27
This decision made news not only because it concerned two high profile 
executives at a world famous company.  It made news -- among legal academics at least -
- because of the court’s apparent new enthusiasm for the duty of good faith.  But the 
response to the decision led to widely divergent conclusions.  At least one commentator, 
Hillary Sale, embraced the decision as an indication of the emergence of a “third, and 
separate, duty: that of good faith,” distinct from the other two fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty.28  She argued that since the court was not willing to categorize the alleged 
misconduct as purely a breach of the duty of care (and thus allow exculpation under 
102(b)(7)), it could only be a question of good faith.29  She concluded that “conscious 
disregard of one’s duties to the company presents a good faith issue, not simply a 
procedural lapse of due care.”30  A key element, then, of Sale’s vision of the duty of good 
faith is the state of mind of the director.  In order for a director to violate the duty of good 
faith, he must have been aware that he was failing to do what he was obligated to do.  
Sale, however, does make clear what kind of behavior might constitute a breach of the 
duty of good faith but not a breach of the duties of loyalty or care.31
26
 Disney II, 825 A.2d at 289.
27
 Disney II, 825 A.2d at 289.
28
 Hillary Sale, “Delaware’s Good Faith,” 89 Cornell L. Rev. 456, 482.
29 Id.
30 Id.  Sale is perhaps suggesting here that since a breach of good faith is not a “procedural lapse of due 
care,” it must therefore be a substantive breach, although she does not use the phrase “substantive due 
care.” 
31
 For my earlier discussion of Sale’s article, see, Rosenberg, supra note__, at 508-509.
10
Other commentators were more hesitant to view good faith as described in Disney 
II as a separate duty.  The author of this article, for example, took essentially the opposite 
view.  He argued that the decision in Disney II fit into a string of cases by the Court of 
Chancery that increasingly treat good faith not as a separate duty but rather as a term that 
encompasses all of the obligations of corporate officers in the same way that parties to a
contract have a duty of good faith.32  That is to say, the duty of good faith requires 
corporate directors to make an honest effort to adhere to the duties of care and loyalty. A 
knowing breach of the duties of care or loyalty (or indeed any other duty) is a breach of 
the duty of good faith.33  Good faith, however, does not exist as a duty that can be defined 
on its own terms without reference to other duties.
In an article that turned out to have a great deal of influence on Chancellor 
Chandler’s later decision in Disney IV, Sean Griffith also rejected the idea that a separate 
duty of good faith had emerged from Disney II.  Rather, he described good faith in 
Disney II as a duty that alternates between loyalty and care without actually 
encompassing either.34 In that decision, Griffith says, good faith covered ground that was 
32 Id.  My approach in that article arose from an ideological view (contractarianism)  embraced by many 
lawyers and academics, that corporations, like other business entities or indeed other business agreements, 
should be viewed as simply conglomerations of contractual promises that require adherence to certain 
duties by the various parties.  Id., at 493-494.  While that article suggested that Delaware courts ought to 
approach corporate fiduciary duties from a contractarian perspective, the accuracy of my assessment of the 
bounds of good faith under Delaware law does not necessarily require adherence to the contractarian view 
by the courts.  
33
 In this article, I will argue that the duty of good faith is in fact more expansive.  Delaware courts appear 
willing to find that a director acted in bad faith simply because his decision was egregious, even if the 
director did not know that he was making an egregiously bad decision.  See infra text and accompanying 
notes__-__.
34
 Sean J. Griffith, “Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law 
Jurisprudence,” 55 Duke L. J. 1, at 21-23 (2005).  In his article, Griffith employs one of the all-time great 
legal metaphors.  He says that the duty of good faith alternates between the duty of care and the duty of 
loyalty like the image of a caged bird in a thaumatrope.  He explains:
[A thaumatrope] is an optical toy involving a disc with a different image on each side – a horse 
and a man, for example, or a bird and a cage – and a string attached to either edge of the disc 
enabling the device to spin.  When the viewer spins the thaumatrope, the images on either side of 
the disc seem to blend together to produce a third image that is a composite of the other two – the 
11
not defined precisely by care or loyalty because the claim in that case could not have 
survived a motion to dismiss on either of those traditional fiduciary duties.35  So if a court 
is relying on good faith to allow a case alleging director misconduct to go forward, what 
is the content of that duty? Griffith believes that good faith ultimately can boil down to 
one question: “Are the directors doing their best in acting for someone else?”36  When 
framed this way, that duty could indeed include conduct that violates either the duty of 
loyalty or the duty of care as well as perhaps other conduct.37
Lyman Johnson views Disney II’s definition of good faith as prohibiting behavior 
where the director consciously knows he is disregarding the duties of care or loyalty.38
To Johnson, good faith is all about motive.  Focusing on the allegations that the Disney 
directors acted with “deliberate indifference” and adopted a “’we don’t care about the 
risks’ attitude,” Johnson asserts that the court in Disney II made inferences about the 
directors’ motives by evaluating their conduct.  Bad faith (that is conduct that is not 
properly motivated) can be construed from the nature of the conduct itself.  Johnson 
presciently explains that, “this allows the court an indirect way to do what the business 
man atop the horse or the bird in the cage.  Good faith, I argue, is simply the application of the 
thaumatrope to the duties of care and loyalty.
Id. at 7-8.
35 Id. at 20.
36 Id. at 43.  As we will see, the court in Disney IV did indeed follow Griffith’s dictum by hinting that bad 
faith might arise from indifference although the directors might not be aware that they are acting with 
indifference.
37
 It is therefore not all that different from this author’s view in Rosenberg, supra note__.  Both Griffith and 
I hold open the possibility that a director can act in bad faith in a way that does not necessarily breach 
either the duty of loyalty or care.
38
 Lyman Johnson, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties,” 30 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1149, 1202-
1203 (2004).   On his blog, D. Gordon Smith expressed a similar view: that good faith review and 
substantive review are essentially the same thing and that the rise of good faith might be leading to greater 
substantive review in the future. http://www.theconglomerate.org/2003/11/the_fiduciary_d.html
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judgment rule precludes –consider the substance of director conduct; not to assess it 
outright, but to draw an inference of bad motive if it is sufficiently egregious.”39
Another scholar, Stephen Bainbridge, addressed the implications of the Disney II 
decision on his blog.  Bainbridge is an ardent proponent of the “director primacy” view of 
the corporation which regards directors as the ultimate powerbrokers in publicly held
corporations.40  Such a view prefers that the business judgment rule be understood as a 
doctrine of abstention, “pursuant to which courts in fact refrain from reviewing board 
decisions unless exacting preconditions for review are satisfied.”41  On his blog,
Bainbridge attempted to reconcile the Disney II decision with existing law by offering 
two competing interpretations of the court’s decision that allowed judicial review of the 
Disney directors’ vote to approve Ovitz’s compensation package.  
In his preferred42 interpretation, he suggested that the court simply understood the 
case as one of “egregiously flawed process due care.”43  Viewed in this way, the court 
focused not so much on the merits of the decision, but on the procedures through which 
the board approved it.  This view rejects the possibility that the decision can be 
interpreted as a reinvigoration of substantive due care because it focuses exclusively on 
the alleged procedural deficiencies of the directors’ decision-making and not on the 
substantive wisdom of the decision itself.
39
 Johnson, supra note__, at 1203.  This seems to come closest to a prediction of what the Court of 
Chancery would later do in Disney IV.
40 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, “Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance,” 97 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 547 (2003).
41
 Stephen M. Bainbridge, “The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,” 57 Vand. L. Rev. 83, 88 
(2004).   The crucial question, of course, is what are those exacting pre-conditions, and what should they 
be? This article attempts to answer only the former question.
42
 “Preferred,” both in the sense of what he thinks the court was saying in its decision and in the sense that 
he believes that this interpretation is preferable. 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/2003/11/substantive_due.html, November 29, 2003.
43 Id.
13
Bainbridge’s second proposed interpretation is more consistent with those who 
have suggested that the decision opens the door to substantive review.  He suggests, as an 
alternative to his preferred interpretation, that the court found the Disney board’s decision 
to be “so egregiously unsound on the merits as to shock the court’s conscience and, 
therefore, fall outside the protections of the business judgment rule.”44  This sounds like 
Bainbridge is leaving open the possibility that the court was reintroducing the doctrine of 
substantive due care.  But he does not really buy this interpretation. Bainbridge goes on 
to say that the facts of the case suggest that more than mere irrationality was motivating 
the directors: “The story that emerges is one of cronyism and backroom deals in which 
preservation of face was put ahead of the corporation’s best interest… [T]his looks like 
another case in which ‘we have reason to disbelieve the protestations of good faith by 
directors who reach “irrational” conclusions.’”45  To Bainbridge, almost any action that 
does not receive business judgment rule protection inevitably contains at least some 
elements of disloyalty or self-dealing even if plaintiffs are alleging only breaches of the 
duty of care or so-called good faith.  This comports with the Court of Chancery’s earlier 
view that good faith “is a subset or ‘subsidiary requirement’ that is subsumed within the 
duty of loyalty.”46  According to this formulation, any act of bad faith must be disloyal, 
but not every act of disloyalty must be bad faith.47
IV.  Substantive Due Care and the Reasonable Director
While the first two Disney decisions, Brehm and Disney II, appear to have done 
little to reconcile the various competing views of the business judgment rule, a hard look 
44 Id.
45 Id. (quoting Michael P. Dooley, Fundamentals of Corporation Law 263 (1995)). 
46
 Emerald Partners, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20, at *89 n. 63.
47
 A director could make a decision that is disloyal without knowing that he is being disloyal.
14
at Delaware law reveals that the rule allows for review of the merits of director 
decisionmaking in extreme cases and that the conduct of the Disney directors is one such 
case.  That the court was willing to do so in Disney IV is not surprising. The apparent rise 
of the duty of good faith even in the absence of disloyalty is merely a manifestation of the 
willingness of the Delaware Court of Chancery to allow substantive due care review 
despite the Delaware Supreme Court’s earlier insistence that it is “foreign to the business 
judgment rule.”48  However, although courts do engage in such review, they rarely are 
willing to hold directors liable for even such awful decisions as the one by the Disney 
directors to approve Michael Ovitz’s compensation package.  The Court of Chancery’s 
decision in Disney IV exemplifies such substantive review.   
Virtually every formulation of the business judgment rule under Delaware law 
contains a requirement that the directors act honestly or in good faith.49  But that is 
merely the starting point.  It is difficult to come up with a definition of the business 
judgment rule that does not beg the question, “what do we mean by ‘good faith?’” For 
example, former Chancellor Allen, probably the Chancery Court’s clearest thinker of the 
last twenty years, described the bounds of the business judgment rule in the following 
way in an influential decision:
Whether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision 
substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through “stupid” to 
“egregious” or “irrational” provides no ground for director liability, so long as the 
court determines that the process employed was either rational or employed in a 
good faith effort to advance corporate interests.”50
48
 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264.
49
 Courts and commentators must take as their starting point, the Delaware Supreme Court’s definition in 
the highly problematic Aronson v. Lewis which held that the business judgment rule presumes “that in 
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in 
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 
1984).  The body of literature criticizing that decision on various grounds is voluminous and continues to 
grow. 
50
 Caremark, 698 A.2d  at 967.
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Stephen Bainbridge usefully points out that in an earlier decision, Chancellor Allen said 
that rationality and good faith are essentially the same thing: “’such limited substantive 
review as the rule contemplates (i.e. is the judgment under review “egregious” or 
“irrational” or “so beyond reason,” etc.) really is a way of inferring bad faith.’” 51  And 
Bainbridge himself does not dispute that rationality is necessary for an action to receive 
business judgment rule protection.52  Despite the abundance of such formulations of the 
business judgment rule, we are still left to define “good faith” and “rational” on our own.
Most students of corporate law are extremely reluctant to suggest that the concept 
of the reasonable person that pervades other areas of law (such as torts) should be 
applicable to corporate directors.  We hesitate to speak of what a reasonable director 
might do in a given situation because, unlike in a situation involving everyday torts, a 
reasonable director might have chosen many different paths for the corporation he 
oversees.53  The ”reasonable” director standard seems too strict because the very term 
51
 Stephen Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics, 274 (quoting In Re RJR Nabisco, Inc. 
Shareholders Litig., 1989 WL 7036 at *13, n. 13 (Del. Ch. 1989) . Interestingly, in the same discussion, 
Bainbridge then goes on to equate irrationality with self-interest alone, a position that seems to be unique to 
him.  Id.  Numerous other commentaries have equated rationality with good faith, including one by the 
then-Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court. E. Norman Veasey, “Musings on the Dynamics of 
Corporate Governance Issues, Director Liability Concerns, Corporate Control Transactions, Ethics and 
Federalism, U. Pa. L. Rev. 1007, 1009 (2003) (“Although the concept of good faith is not fully developed 
in the case law, an argument could be made that reckless, irresponsible, or irrational conduct but not 
necessarily self-dealing or larcenous conduct could implicate concepts of good faith.”). 
52Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics, supra note__, at 274.  See also, 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/2003/11/substantive_due.html, November 29, 2003, (“an essential 
precondition for application of the business judgment rule long has been the absence of irrationality.”).  But 
he is not willing to say that an inquiry into the rationality of a decision would constitute substantive review 
of the merits of the decision. Bainbridge, Corporation Law, supra note__ at 274.
53
 William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs and Leo E. Strine, “Realigning the Standard of Review of director Due 
Care With Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny as a Standard of Review 
Problem, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 449, 454 (2002).  The chancellors use as an example the case of automobile 
accidents.  They point out that in that context, “only one decision is reasonable in a given set of 
circumstances, so decisions that turn out badly almost invariably turn out to have been bad decisions.” Id.  
In contrast, if the business judgment rule stands for anything at all, it is that decisions that turn out badly 
are not necessarily bad decisions.
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carries with it the suggestion that only one – or perhaps a few – courses of conduct were 
reasonable under any given set of circumstance.  
Since the “reasonable director” standard is disfavored, some other standard, not 
too strict and not utterly lacking in teeth must prevail.  Rather than asking whether a 
director acted “reasonably,” courts often asked whether she acted “rationally.” Former 
Chancellor Allen and Chancellors Jacobs and Strine argue that “a rationality standard 
gives directors greater freedom to make risky decisions than a reasonableness 
standard.”54 And they attempt to draw a distinction between these two standards 
(reasonable and rational) by defining an irrational decision as one “that is so blatantly 
imprudent that it is inexplicable, in the sense that no well-motivated and minimally 
informed person could have made it.”55  But it is not obvious how much broader this 
standard really is than a reasonable director standard.  What kind of behavior does not 
pass the reasonable director standard that would pass the rationality test as described 
above?  Neither the requirement of prudence, good motivation nor minimal information 
seems to allow much behavior that would not already be permissible under the 
requirement that a director act reasonably.  It is not clear, then, how the widely accepted 
rationality standard differs in reality from the much-shunned reasonableness standard.  
And indeed, application of the rationality standard often sounds a lot like an application 
of the reasonableness standard and therefore an inquiry into the substance of the 
directors’ decision.
In a well-known case in which a board of directors was accused of breaching its 
fiduciary duty to accept the highest price available in a tender offer, Chancellor Allen 
54 Id., at 452.
55
 Allen et al. supra note__, at 452 (italics added).
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allowed the directors to be protected by the business judgment rule.56  Though he 
explicitly rejects the idea that he has engaged in substantive review of the directors’ 
action, much of his language, sounds very much like an inquiry into its substance: 
…it was not beyond the range of reasonable responses, in the circumstances in 
which the overall objective was to get a committed deal at $64 per share cash 
from [the bidder]… These are precisely the sort of debatable questions that are 
beyond the expertise of courts and which the business judgment rule generally 
protects from substantive review for wisdom… certainly, the decision… in these 
circumstances does not fall so far afield of the expected range of responses to 
warrant an inference that [they] must have been motivated by a concern other than 
maximizing the value of shareholders interest.57
Here, Chancellor Allen appears to be asking whether a reasonable director might have 
done the same thing under the circumstances; whether the director’s actions were of the 
type that might have been expected under the circumstances.  Because the directors’ 
actions appeared to be reasonable, they did not allow for an inference that the directors 
were motivated by improper concerns.  That is to say, because the directors’ actions were 
reasonable, they were in good faith. The case does not stand for the proposition that 
anything worse than “reasonable” or “expected” is actionable but it does suggest that 
decisions outside of the usual range of what is expected might lead to an inference that 
the director acted in bad faith.  Allen explicitly rejects the possibility of substantive 
review of the decision, but then seems to be reviewing its substance.  How can a court 
decide if a decision is “reasonable” or if it falls within the “expected range of 
responses”58 without first examining the substantive wisdom of the decision itself?
56
 In re J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988).
57 Id. at 783.  Italics added.
58
 Here, the wisdom of Allen et al.’s contrasting of corporate decisionmaking with other kinds of 
decisionmaking becomes crucial.  The range of unactionable decisions by a driver when approaching a stop 
sign is very narrow.  Pretty much any decision other than to stop at the white line could give rise to a cause 
of action in negligence.   Anything else is “far afield of the range of expected responses.”  But given the 
innumerable variables at work in corporate decisionmaking, the range of expected responses is very wide 
indeed.  A court can only determine if a decision is within that range by evaluating its substance.
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Justice Veasey explicitly rejected any notion of the reasonableness standard in 
Brehm I only to embrace it more recently in a speech, perhaps inadvertently.  In Brehm I, 
Veasey wrote, “Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments.  We do 
not even decide if they are reasonable in this context.”59  But a few years later, in a 
speech in which he quoted much of the Brehm I opinion verbatim, Veasey said, “If the 
board’s decision or conduct is irrational or so beyond reason that no reasonable director 
would credit the decision or conduct, lack of good faith may, in some circumstances, be 
inferred.”60  This too is beginning to sound like the reasonableness standard.  When a 
court is willing to ask, “would a reasonable director have approved this decision,” it is 
indeed measuring or quantifying a director’s judgment.61
Once we are asking what a reasonable director would have done, we must decide 
what we mean by “reasonable.”  Volumes of literature already exist on this question in 
other contexts, particularly torts.  Studies of corporate law have not inquired into the 
definition of a reasonable director because the prevailing wisdom has been that the law 
calls for no such inquiry.  But as the above discussion demonstrates, in order to know 
whether an action receives the protection of the business judgment rule, it might be 
relevant to ask whether a reasonable director would have approved it.
The reasonable standard works well in torts because, as Allen et al. point out, 
there, “typically only one decision is reasonable in a given set of circumstances.”62  In an 
area like traffic safety, the law is plainly designed to discourage risk-taking because such 
59
 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264.
60
 Veasey, supra note__, at 1010.
61Another commentator has used similar language.  See, Ryan Houseal, “Beyond the Business Judgment 
Rule: Protecting Bidder Firm Shareholders From Value-Reducing Acquisitions,” 37 U. Mich. J. L. Reform. 
193, 224 (2003) (“A lack of substantive due care on the part of a firm's board of directors may be found 
when the board consummates a deal that is so bad that no reasonable director could possibly have approved 
it. In other words, the deal had no proper business purpose.”).
62
 Allen et al., supra note__, at 454.
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behavior offers virtually no social utility.   In the corporate marketplace however, risk-
taking is an inherent part of virtually every decision a director makes – and we want it 
that way.63  While most corporate lawyers hesitate to use this kind of language, it is 
oftentimes reasonable for a corporate director to make a decision – even one that an 
impartial observer might call rash or risky – that is unlikely to benefit the shareholders of 
the corporation because corporate decision-making requires taking risks.64  It is even 
reasonable for a corporate director to make a decision that turns out to harm his company 
and that a judge might later find to be puzzling or misguided.  We want directors to make 
these kinds of decisions because often enough they turn out to enrich the shareholders.  
And indeed, the law allows a great deal of discretion for directors to take such risks -- as 
long as they act rationally and in good faith.   Although few commentators are willing to 
say so explicitly, the law seems to be saying that a rational  director is simply one who 
has made a decision that a reasonable director might also have made.  In tort law, we ask 
what a reasonable person would have done under the circumstances.  Perhaps, the 
business judgment rule is really simply asking what decision would a reasonable director 
have made under the circumstances, implicitly acknowledging that the circumstances of a 
corporation call for very different standards of risk taking, uncertainty and tolerance for 
failure.
63
 Allen et al. put it nicely: “Because the expected value of a risky business decision may be greater than 
that of a less risky decision, directors may be acting in the best interest of the shareholders when they 
choose the riskier alternative.” Allen et al., supra note __ at 455.  For a discussion of how the law can 
encourage risk-taking in other kinds of business organizations, see, David Rosenberg, “Venture Capital 
Limited Partnerships: A Study in Freedom of Contract,” 2002 Colum. Bus. L. Rev 363 (2002).
64
 Again, this is in contrast to automobile driving in which there will always be liability for calculated risks 
that turn out badly.  Perhaps my use of the term “calculated” begs the question.  We expect directors to take 
risks based on their knowledge of the extent of the risk.  But if no calculation is made and the decision 
turns out badly, that might very well constitute bad faith on the part of the director.
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As Allen et al. acknowledge, it is very difficult to come up with a meaningful 
distinction between the standards of “reasonable” and “rational” as they apply to 
corporate directors.65  It is perhaps impossible, because a rational director is one who 
makes only decisions that he believes to be reasonable.  After all, it would not be rational 
for a director to make a decision that he believes does not rise to the level of what a 
reasonable director would do.66  If the director knew that his decision was unreasonable, 
then surely his action would constitute irrationality or bad faith.  If the director did not 
know that his decision was unreasonable, then he himself is by definition an unreasonable 
director and he has come very close to the kind of irrationality that is not protected by the 
business judgment rule. Further, if the director’s decision is objectively reasonable, it 
does not matter whether he employed a rational procedure to arrive at that decision.
But the standard for culpability for a breach of the duty of care by a corporate 
director is not merely negligence (by reviewing the reasonableness of the director’s 
actions), but rather gross negligence, which, in the corporate context, means “”reckless 
indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders or actions 
which are ‘without the bounds of reason.’”67  Or as Allen et al. paraphrase the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brehm, “the gross negligence standard applicable in due 
65
 They explain:
Admittedly, the distinction between “reasonable” and “rational” action is often subtle and elusive 
to grasp.  Linguistically, it is odd to think of a board decision as unreasonable yet “rational,” since 
both concepts rest in great part on whether the conduct was logical in the circumstances.
Allen et al., supra note__, at fn. 13.  
66
 For a similar argument regarding the definition of good faith under Section 102(b)(7), see Rosenberg, 
supra note__.  
67
 Allen et al., supra note __ at 453, citing Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., No. 7861, 95 Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) 327 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 1990). That is to say, an unknowingly bad action on the part of a director 
will be considered reasonable unless it is “without the bounds of reason.”  
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care cases is, functionally speaking, a proxy for the rationality standard of the business 
judgment rule.”68
All commentators agree that courts ought to be able to review director decisions if 
those decisions are either irrational or made in bad faith.  Some, however, believe that 
such review is never substantive because any irrational or bad faith act on the part of a 
director must necessarily implicate his duty of loyalty.  These commentators cannot 
conceive of examples in which director conduct rose to the level of irrationality or bad 
faith for some reason other than self-interest.  Stephen Bainbridge, for example, says that 
“inquiry into the rationality of a decision is a proxy for an inquiry into whether the 
decision was tainted by self-interest.”69  Since, to Bainbridge, irrationality is bad faith, 
the only kind of breach that should not be protected by the business judgment rule is a 
breach of the duty of loyalty.  Yet one case he cites to support this proposition is clearly 
not a borderline case: in Parnes v. Bally Entertainment, cited in Bainbridge’s treatise, the 
plaintiff had alleged bribery on the part of the CEO.  That case is plainly one in which 
self-interest plays a key role and is not merely being inferred from the substantives 
awfulness of the board’s decisions.70
Yet even Bainbridge seems to allow for the possibility that courts will allow 
review of the substantive merits of a decision:
it may be that there are some board decision that are so dumb that the business 
judgment rule will not insulate them from judicial review.  Even if the set of such 
decision is not an empty one, however, the tail ought not wag the dog.  Because a 
prerequisite of rationality easily can erode into a prerequisite of reasonableness, 
68
 Allen et al. supra note__ at 457.  In the same article, the authors assert that the “gross negligence 
standard limits the ability of judges to intervene in business decisions made by properly motivated
directors.”  Id. at 450 (italics added).   
69
 Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics, supra note__, at 274.
70
 Id. at 275.  Bainbridge paraphrases, “Bally’s CEO allegedly demanded bribes from prospective takeover 
bidders and, moreover, allegedly received such a bribe from the successful bidder.” Id. at 275.
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courts must tread wearily here.  If they want to persist in requiring that there be a 
rational business purpose, at least they can ensure that that requirement lacks 
teeth.71
There must be a point at which a court will look at a decision that appears to be free from 
any hint of disloyalty and review it simply because of its utter galactic stupidity.72
Bainbridge is merely saying that he prefers that point to be relatively far in the direction 
of stupidity because he does not want courts reviewing director decision-making using a 
reasonableness standard.  But this is precisely what the Disney IV court did.
V. The Application of Substantive Due Care Analysis
The central holding in Chancellor Chandler’s decision in Disney IV cleared the 
defendant directors of personal liability for allegedly acting in bad faith in approving 
Michael Ovitz’s stupendously generous compensation package.  Given that the directors’ 
cursory approval of that package was, in retrospect, a truly awful decision from a 
business point of view, the court’s refusal to impose liability can be interpreted, at least 
superficially, as a victory for supporters of a broad interpretation of the business 
judgment rule’s protection.  Certainly these facts looked like a rather compelling case for 
bad faith. While Chandler acknowledged that the directors failed “to comply with the 
aspirational ideal of best practices,” in most of the opinion he seemed defiantly opposed 
to allowing courts to review the substance of their decision-making.73  And yet, when
faced with the task of justifying his decision not to impose liability on any of the 
directors, Chandler, like other Delaware judges before him, indeed showed a willingness 
to review the substance of the decision the directors had made.
71 Id.
72
 While this term has not yet entered the legal lexicon, it does have a semi-legal source.  See, A Few Good 
Men, (Columbia Pictures 1992) (motion picture). 
73
 Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 2.
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At the outset of his discussion of the legal standards for imposition of liability in 
the case, Chandler says that his decision will not hinge on the duty of loyalty, but rather 
on whether the directors adhered to their duties of care and good faith74, although he later 
also admits that “[d]ecisions from the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of 
Chancery are far from clear with respect to whether there is a separate duty of good 
faith.”75   The reader must already have the sense that, even with these made-to-order 
facts, Chandler is not going to provide a definition of the duty of good faith that will 
unify the various versions provided by Delaware courts in the past.  Nonetheless, what 
emerges from the opinion is at least one example of what the limits of good faith conduct
might be when the conduct of directors is pushed to the very edge of business judgment 
rule protection.  Based on his discussion of the failings of the various directors, it is clear 
that Chandler would find bad faith when a director takes action that he knows is not in 
the best interests of the corporation although that action in no way benefits the interests 
of the director himself either.  The key to Chandler’s analysis is his examination of the 
intentions of the directors.  While the conduct of most of the directors did not suggest to 
Chandler that they acted in bad faith – and their intentions did not need to be examined --
the conduct of the two most uninvolved directors came very close indeed.  Since there 
was scant evidence regarding their deliberations, it was impossible to determine whether 
or not these directors knew that they were making a bad decision.  Therefore, in order to 
establish that their conduct did not rise to the level of bad faith, Chandler did what all 
judges must do when assessing allegations of non-disloyal bad faith: he evaluated the 
substantive wisdom of their decision.  
74
 Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 105.
75
 Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 119.
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Chandler acknowledges that “issues of good faith are (to a certain degree) 
inseparably and necessarily intertwined with the duties of care and loyalty,”76 and his 
opinion wrestles with distinguishing between the two.  At the outset of his discussion  of 
the business judgment rule, Chandler quotes at length from Sean Griffith’s article on the 
subject in which Griffith points out what should be obvious but has been absent from 
most discussions of the business judgment rule: that an ordinarily prudent corporate 
director would not behave disloyally; that an ordinarily prudent corporate director would 
not knowingly act against the best interests of the corporation.77  The key point which 
Chandler extracts from Griffith is that an egregious breach of the duty of care can be 
disloyalty and that disloyalty is necessarily bad faith.  This point emerges later on in 
Chandler’s opinion: 
Upon long and careful consideration, I am of the opinion that the concept of 
intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities, is 
an appropriate (although not the only) standard for determining whether 
fiduciaries have acted in good faith.  Deliberate indifference and inaction in the 
face of a duty to act is, in my mind, conduct that is clearly disloyal to the 
corporation.  It is the epitome of faithless conduct.78
This statement clearly equates actionable negligence with disloyalty and therefore bad 
faith.79  Directors will be free from liability if they unknowingly or unintentionally act 
against the best interests of the corporation.  On the other hand, a director who knowingly 
76
 Dinsey IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 105.
77
 Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 106, quoting Griffith, supra note__.
78
 Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 123.  
79
 Chandler is not being careless in equating bad faith negligence with disloyalty here.  His use of the term 
disloyal means not necessarily self-interest (as Bainbridge suggests it must always be) but rather a knowing 
failure to take the necessary action to make a decision that would benefit the corporation – a failure to 
engage in the kind of deliberation that would make a decision “rational.” Later in the opinion he says it 
again: “Acts not in good faith (regardless of whether they might fall under the loyalty or care aspects of 
good faith) are in any event non-exculpable because they are disloyal to the corporation.” Disney IV, 2005 
WL 1875804 at 125, FN 463.  
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or intentionally acts against the best interests of the corporation will have acted disloyally 
and therefore in bad faith even if his actions did not benefit him personally.  
So how can a court know if a director’s conduct falls in that narrow area between 
self-serving disloyalty and gross negligence?  If the director acted with a malicious 
motive, then bad faith is easy to infer.  But Chandler purports to be unsure about the 
possibility of establishing bad faith, absent such evidence: “It is unclear, based upon 
existing jurisprudence, whether motive is a necessary element for a successful claim that 
a director acted in bad faith, and, if so, whether that motive must be shown explicitly or 
whether it can be inferred from the director’s conduct.”80  Although Chandler expresses 
such doubts, his discussion of some of directors’ failings plainly relies on an analysis of 
their conduct itself absent any reference to their possible motive to act as they did.
Chandler addresses the alleged liability of each defendant director in separate 
sections because the evidence presented regarding the alleged misconduct of each 
director was different.  He begins with CEO Michael Eisner, “clearly the person most 
heavily involved in bringing Ovitz to the Company.”81  Although he points out Eisner’s 
many failings as a corporate leader, Chandler rejects the possibility that Eisner acted with 
gross negligence because the plaintiff failed to establish that Eisner was not aware of “all 
material information reasonably available” regarding Ovitz’s employment package.82
Further, because Eisner was so involved and because the evidence of Eisner’s motives in 
hiring Ovitz were so well-documented, Chandler has an easy time probing Eisner’s mind 
and concluding that his actions, “were taken with the subjective belief that those actions 
80
 Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 122.
81
 Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 134.
82
 Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 140.
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were in the best interests of the company.” 83  That is all that is required to free Eisner 
from liability because that subjective belief establishes Eisner’s good faith.
Chandler next discusses the allegations against Irwin Russell who was chairman 
of the compensation committee.  Here again, Chandler criticizes Russell’s conduct as 
falling far short of the ideal course of action, but also finds that such shortcomings did 
not constitute gross negligence because “Russell for the most part knew what he needed 
to know… and was doing the best he thought he could to advance the interest of the 
company…”84  Note here that Chandler is not evaluating the substantive worthiness or 
wisdom of the decision.  Rather, he is saying that Russell’s decision passes muster 
because he based it on the information that was reasonably available to him at the time.  
There appears to be nothing about the way that the decision was reached that might 
implicate Russell’s good faith.  As with Eisner, Chandler’s conclusion about Russell’s 
motives and state of mind are sufficient to clear him of any allegations of bad faith.
Chandler evaluates the conduct of director Raymond Watson in a similar fashion.  
He points out that Watson was familiar with Ovitz’s proposed package and with the 
executive compensation decisions more generally.  Alluding to the decision in Disney II, 
Chandler says that “[n]othing in his conduct leads me to believe that he took an ‘ostrich-
like’ approach to considering and approving,”85 Ovitz’s contract.  He means that the 
evidence does not suggest that Watson deliberately avoided important facts in reaching 
his decision.  Since Chandler finds no evidence that leads him to believe that Watson 
“had anything in mind other than the best interests of the Company,”86 he finds that 
83
 Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 141.
84
 Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 145.
85
 Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 146.   
86
 Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 147.
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Watson did not act in bad faith.  Again, the holding regarding Watson focuses solely on 
the nature of Watson’s conduct rather than his substantive decision.
Chandler’s analysis however takes a radical turn when he addresses the conduct 
and decision of two other directors, Sidney Poitier and Ignacio Lozano.  It is clear from 
the outset that these two were much less involved in the decisionmaking regarding 
Ovitz’s hiring and that, of all the directors, their conduct comes closest to gross 
negligence or bad faith.87  But what sets apart the opinion’s discussion of Poitier and 
Lozano is that, unlike in his discussion of all the other directors, here Chandler takes a 
close look at the substantive reasonableness of their decision in order to conclude that 
they were neither grossly negligent nor acting in bad faith.88
As in his discussion of the other directors, Chandler presents Poitier and Lozano 
as less than ideal directors who nevertheless were made aware of  “all material reasonable 
available” to them.89  But unlike in his analysis of the other directors, Chandler here takes 
the time to judge the reasonableness of the decision based on the information available.  
Viewed objectively, the compensation committee was asked to make a 
decision knowing that: 1) Ovitz was a third party with whom Russell negotiated at 
arms' length; 2) regardless of whether Ovitz truly was “the most powerful man in 
Hollywood,” he was a highly-regarded industry figure; 3) Ovitz was widely 
believed to possess skills and experience that would be very valuable to the 
Company, especially in light of the CapCities/ABC acquisition, Wells' death, and 
Eisner's medical problems; 4) in order to accept the Company's presidency, Ovitz 
was leaving and giving up his very successful business, which would lead a 
reasonable person to believe that he would likely be highly successful in similar 
87
 Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 147.
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 Curiously, Chandler also takes several pages to distinguish between the facts in this case and those of 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, the case which set the standard for gross negligence in Delaware. Disney IV, 2005 
WL 1875804 at 149-155.  The main distinction which Chandler draws is that the decision at issue in Van 
Gorkom was of much greater magnitude and had much larger “financial implications” than did the decision 
to hire Ovitz at terms so favorable to him.  The financial implications of a decision surely matter in a 
discussion of the potential damages a court might award if the decision is actionable, but it does not seem 
to matter a great deal to a discussion of the bad faith or alleged gross negligence of those who made the 
decision -- at least it shouldn’t.
89
 Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 155.
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pursuits elsewhere in the industry; 5) the CEO and others in senior management 
were supporting the hiring; and 6) the potential compensation was not 
economically material to the Company.90
From this, Chandler concludes that Poitier and Lozano “acted in a manner that they 
believed was in the best interests of the corporation.”91  But viewing the facts in the 
paragraph excerpted objectively (as Chandler does) does not necessarily lead to that 
conclusion.  Rather, it leads to the conclusion that a reasonable director might have 
approved Ovitz’s package based on the facts at hand. Here, Chandler is holding that 
Poitier and Lozano breached no duty, not because the evidence suggests that they took 
the appropriate care and had the appropriate motives, but because the decision itself was 
reasonable based on the facts presented to them.  With regard to Poitier and Lozano, 
therefore, Chandler has reached his decision by judging the substantive wisdom of their 
actions.  This is precisely what a strict interpretation of the business judgment rule is 
supposed to prohibit. 
Why the special treatment for Poitier and Lozano?  The court took the extreme 
measure of evaluating the substance of the actions of these directors because it could not 
establish good faith and the absence of gross negligence based on the procedural 
evidence alone.  While the other directors had appeared at least to attempt to acquire the 
necessary information to arrive at a decision in the best interests of the company, thereby 
demonstrating good faith and care, there was virtually nothing in Poitier and Lozano’s 
conduct from which adherence to those duties could be construed.  Indeed, it might be 
said that their action comes close to being outside the protections of the business 
90
 Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 157-158.
91
 Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 158.
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judgment rule because there is not much evidence that it had any rational basis 
whatsoever.  
Chandler was of course aware of the requirement that a directors’ decision be 
arrived at in a rational way.  Earlier in his opinion, he quoted at length from Chancellor 
Allen’s decision in Caremark, in which Allen explained why business judgment rule 
analysis requires a focus on procedure and not substance:
What should be understood, but may not widely be understood by courts or 
commentators who are not often required to face such questions, is that 
compliance with a director's duty of care can never appropriately be judicially 
determined by reference to the content of the board decision that leads to a 
corporate loss, apart from consideration of the good faith or rationality of the 
process employed. That is, whether a judge or jury considering the matter after 
the fact, believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending 
through “stupid” to “egregious” or “irrational,” provides no ground for director 
liability, so long as the court determines that the process employed was either 
rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests. To 
employ a different rule-one that permitted an “objective” evaluation of the 
decision-would expose directors to substantive second guessing by ill-equipped 
judges or juries, which would, in the long-run, be injurious to investor interests. 
Thus, the business judgment rule is process oriented and informed by a deep 
respect for all good faith board decisions.92
But Chandler could not find any real evidence of rational behavior by Poitier or Lozano, 
so he had to look elsewhere to justify their decision.  The only way for Chandler to 
establish the good faith of these directors was to examine the substance of the decision 
and conclude that it was reasonable under the circumstances even it was not arrived at 
through a rational procedure. 
As discussed earlier, the conventional view of the business judgment rule is that it 
requires that directors make rational – not necessarily reasonable – decisions.93  But in 
Disney IV, Chandler was unable to find evidence that the directors employed a rational 
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process in arriving at their decision.  He therefore looked at the substantive 
reasonableness of the decision by the two most uninvolved directors and found that their 
decision was not actionable because “viewed objectively”94 it was reasonable and 
therefore in good faith.  This is precisely what Chancellor Allen seems to have done in In
Re J.P. Stevens.95  In that case, Allen refused to impose liability on directors because 
their decision “was not beyond the range of reasonable responses…” and did not “fall so 
far afield of the expected range of responses to warrant an inference that [they] must have 
been motivated by a concern other than maximizing the value of shareholders’ interest.”96
VI. Applying the “Galactic Stupidity” Standard
The distinction between a rational director (the accepted standard) and a 
reasonable director (the standard occasionally applied) is perhaps meaningless.  While 
demonstrating rationality (for example by showing that the director considered the 
information available in making his decision) is enough to warrant the protection of the 
business judgment rule, rationality is not the only way for a director to avoid liability.  In 
the absence of such evidence, Delaware courts may well consider the reasonableness of 
the decision to establish the good faith of the director even though the evidence does not 
suggest that the director acted rationally in arriving at that decision.  Absent evidence of 
rational deliberation, a court may then examine the substantive reasonableness of a 
94
 Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 157.
95
 See supra text and accompanying notes__-__. 
96
 J.P. Stevens at 783.  Chancellor Allen used similar language in the increasingly cited case of Gagliardi v. 
Trifoods International, 683 A.2d 1049 (1996).  In discussing the business judgment rule’s protection for 
directors who make risky decisions, Allen said:
[the business judgment rule] in effect provides that where a director is independent and 
disinterested, there can be no liability for corporate loss, unless the facts are such that no person 
could possibly authorize such a transaction if he or she were attempting in good faith to meet their 
duty.
Gagliardi, at 1052-1053, citing Saxe v. Brady, Del. Ch. 184 A.2d 602 (1962).  Again, regardless of the 
process used to arrive at the decision, courts will not impose liability for a decision as long as a person 
acting in good faith might also have made that decision.   The only way that a court can know if the 
decision rises to that level is to examine its substantive wisdom.   
31
director’s decision in order to infer the director’s good faith.  But this inquiry does not 
really have to do with the motives or good faith of the director.  Rather it is plainly an 
inquiry into the substantive reasonableness of the decision using gross negligence as the 
standard.  Directors therefore get two swings of the bat: they show good faith if they have 
demonstrated that they made their decision rationally; and they can show good faith if 
their decision was reasonable, even if they did not arrive at that decision in a rational 
manner.97
Even the most ardent opponent of substantive review agrees that in extreme cases, 
courts might have to engage in such analysis.  While insisting that bad faith almost 
always arises from self-interest, Stephen Bainbridge nonetheless agrees that sometimes 
substantive analysis will be necessary, although in keeping with his “abstention doctrine” 
he would like to set the bar very high indeed.98   The set of such cases in which a judge 
might engage in substantive review under the business judgment rule is perhaps small 
because virtually any decision by a director that is not disloyal can in some way be found 
to be rational.  But where a court finds no evidence of rationality, it will inevitably ask if 
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the substance of the decision was reasonable.  As such, a court may very well find bad 
faith by simply evaluating the sheer galactic stupidity of a decision.
VII. Conclusion
Courts correctly shy away from reviewing the substance of directors’ decisions 
unless it is clear that the director had a conflict of interest that influenced his decision.  
This policy serves the goal of allowing directors to take risks in the interests of the 
corporation.   But it wrong to insist that courts never examine the substantive 
reasonableness of directors’ decisions.  This approach ignores the ability of courts to 
evaluate what a reasonable director would do by taking into account the speculativeness 
and inherent risk-taking necessary to run a corporation.  Where disputes do not present 
evidence regarding the procedural reasonableness of a director’s decision or evidence 
regarding the director’s state of mind, courts must inevitably evaluate the substance of the 
director’s decision.  Courts do not usually have to make such an inquiry, but they will in 
cases that approach the edge of the business judgment rule’s protections. Courts will not 
often impose liability for the galactic stupidity of directors, but the possibility must exist 
or else the duty of good faith dissolves completely (and therefore uselessly) into a duty of 
loyalty and nothing more.  There is no danger in asking what a reasonable director would 
do because the answer is: a reasonable director would make the kind of decision that a 
rational director acting in good faith would make.  And that standard is not any more 
strict than the one that already prevails under the business judgment rule.
